presuppose a realist philosophy of science in which it is possible to talk about truth--or truth-likeness--and progress. This article aims to illuminate the philosophical and methodological assumptions underlying the <i>DSM</i>, clearing the way for a new understanding of the classification enterprise, one that embraces realism as a goal, fallibilism as a method, and dimensions as a (perhaps yet-to-be-realized) empirical finding.<p>

<center><h2>Issues in the Philosophy of Science</h2></center>
<h3>Certaint meets the necessary <i>DSM</i> diagnostic criteria for Y.<p>
</blockquote>

Logic is the wellspring of certainty--the only beliefs that are certain are true by virtue of logical relations and definitions. For example, tautologies (trivially true statements of the form, If P, then P) can rightly be considered certainties. Skepticism concerning non-trivial certainties, however, is well warranted and is incorporated directly into the methodological approach known variously as critical rationalism, critical realism, or fallibilist realism.<p>

<h3>Realisms</h3>
There are many versions of realism. Most versions of realism embrace what has been called the copy theory of truth, that there comes to be an agreement between concept and referent that reflects the actual state of the world; truth is defined as accuracy in identifying the items to which a term correctly refers. A similar definition of realism is given by Putnam (1982):<p>

<blockquote>
the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence between wo